duties will obtain in every contract, but some, notably the duty of honesty, should.
2 I have elsewhere analysed the detail of Leggatt J's judgment and in particular the alternative ways in which good faith might be recognised in the English law. 3 I wish to put this to one side in order to focus on the logically prior claim that the law of contractual agreement institutionalises other-regarding, moral duties. Even if this claim is allowed, it leaves entirely open the possible form of the legal recognition of good faith.
A decision of the High Court, such authority as Yam Seng might exercise could largely be only persuasive and, in brief, its treatment of good faith 4 has not been found very persuasive on the more or less score of occasions it has been at least mentioned in the higher courts of England and Wales. 5 The principal result 6 of its consideration by the Court of Appeal has been the drawing of a distinction between the interpretation and the implication of good faith. Whilst the parties may stipulate a duty of good faith which should be recognised as a matter of interpretation, in the absence of such stipulation a duty of good faith should not be implied into a contract. . Leggatt J's language seems to leave open the possibility of there being some cases in which the duty of honesty does not obtain but doing so, it is respectfully submitted, is inconsistent with his core claim. That empirically there are contracts which purport to exclude liability for dishonesty is of course the case. whatever the broad similarities between them, [interpretation and implication] are 'different processes governed by different rules' … because 'the implication of contract terms involves a different and altogether more ambitious undertaking: the interpolation of terms to deal with matters for which, ex hypothesi, the parties themselves have made no provision '. 8 This is to claim that, if one is not implying good faith, one is not implying. This is not so.
Instead of implying that the parties intentions were formed on the basis of (and therefore should be interpreted against) an attitude which Leggatt J sought to capture by reference to good faith, the distinction between interpretation and implication actually does imply, in the absence of a stipulation of good faith, that the parties' intentions were formed on the basis of (and therefore should be interpreted against) an attitude of self-interest. In the House of Lords judgment in Walford v Miles which is regarded as the definitive modern statement of this attitude, Lord Ackner (with whom all their Lordships concurred) said that:
the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations. 9 As it was from the self-interested attitude that Leggatt J sought to depart, 10 he seems, save in the cases of express stipulation of good faith, where perhaps his labours were not so imperatively required, to have laboured (so far at least) largely in vain.
I am of the opinion that no real progress will be made until this opposition of the attitudes towards contracting thought to be captured by good faith and self-interest is shown Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 at 138E (HL). 10 Walford v Miles was swiftly distinguished in Yam Seng on the ground that it concerned good faith in negotiation rather than, as in Yam Seng, good faith in performance: Yam Seng (n 1) [122] . See further n 88.
to be the false dichotomy it is. I have long believed that the English law in fact contains the doctrinal resources to do this, 11 but I do not wish again to go over ground now so well covered by Leggatt J. 12 I want, initially at least, to step away from the distinction between interpretation and implication, indeed from the law which Leggatt J sought to organise around good faith, and turn to the social philosophical roots of the understanding of selfinterest in the law of contract; which means, of course, turning to Adam Smith. 13 In what may be the most influential passage in all of modern European social thought, Smith unforgettably wrote that:
In civilised society [man] stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes [and] has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour … and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their selflove, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
14 What does this description of exchange in terms of self-interest mean for a law of contract which attempts to provide the legal framework for economic action? As it has been taken up in neo-classical economics and in the classical law of contract, Smith's concept of selfinterest has been regarded as emptying exchange of other-regarding moral content, Lord
Ackner's views in Walford v Miles being a paradigmatic expression of this.
11 D Campbell, "The relational constitution of the discrete contract", in D Campbell and P Vincent-Jones (eds), Contract and Economic Organisation (1996) 40. 12 In addition to certain doctrines mentioned in the paper I have just cited which should be added to Leggatt J's list, much greater emphasis should be placed on implied terms as the principal constituents of all but very exceptional contracts: H Collins, "Implied terms: The foundation in good faith and fair dealing" (2014) 67 CLP 297. 13 Any attempt to assess the importance of Smith for the law of contract is now, of course, indebted to PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) at 294-304. However, the account of self-interest advanced here implicitly criticises Atiyah, who accepted the (to use a term to be developed later) solipsistic view of self-interest, exchange and laissez faire, and, stressing that view's shortcomings, described the necessity of curtailing self-interest, a process in which welfarist legislation played a major role. It is argued here that the laissez faire view was not self-conscious of the other-regarding quality implicit in exchange motivated by self-interest, and the point is not to curtail self-interest but to make it, in Hegel's terms, actual. 14 A Smith, Smith's views of the exercise of self-interest specifically in the economic sphere from his views of its exercise generally, and adequate discussion of the relationship of the specific and the general would require Smith's views of the overall range of human motivations to be taken into account. But, so far as it is possible, I shall avoid discussion of Smith's general moral philosophy and will broaden out discussion of his understanding of the self-interest which motivates economic exchange only in so far as this is needed for the analysis of the exercise of self-interest through contract.
Smith regarded it as a very positive feature of self-interest as the motivation of economic exchange that it was quite distinct from a direct concern with the public interest.
Smith believed the impulse to "bettering our condition" to be universal amongst humankind, 16 but that the material and hence cultural improvement of modern European society arose from a particular means of betterment. In the "Age of Commerce", the highest of the four stages of the development of European society, 17 the general liberation of "a certain propensity in human nature … to … exchange one thing for another" 18 had brought about the general division of labour which is the source of the historically unprecedented wealth of that Age. 19 The division of labour, however, was "not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion". 20 It rather was an unintended consequence of the degree of specialisation permitted by the generalisation of exchange.
It is impossible even to be remotely fully cognisant of, much less to supervise, the tantamount to infinite complexity of economic action under a developed division of labour.
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Economic order in commercial society is established, not by a conscious attempt to establish that order, but as an emergent property of economic actors' pursuit of their self-interest:
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage indeed, and not that of society which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to society … every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue as great as he can. He generally indeed neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it … he intends only his own gain and he is … led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
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Smith himself saw the invisible hand, by the working of which "the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord", 23 When, for example, Smith claimed that "Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of affluence" in addition to giving Nature "her fair play in the pursuit of her own ends", in an omitted clause he specified that the "Little else" was the not inconsiderable task of maintaining "peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice". 35 And the effect of leaving the invisible hand to establish the system of natural liberty was that: course, take the form of mere appropriation, especially, Smith believed, in commercial society, where the very accumulation of property provides a degree of incentive to mere appropriation not found in rude societies. 37 He therefore argued that, after ensuring a political society's protection "from the violence and invasion of other independent societies" and so securing the "external peace" essential to the society's very existence, 38 "the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice" was the second proper function of government, 39 coming before what we have seen was the third, "erecting and maintaining certain public works and public institutions". Self-interest is the driving force of improvement -"The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition" -only because, when exercised consistently with justice, it takes the beneficent form of exchange, and so becomes "the principle from which public and national, as well as private, opulence is originally derived". 40 In sum, Smith saw that what I will call regulation is necessary for a market to exist because it is necessary to channel self-interest and ultimately that channelling must be enforced by the monopoly of violence.
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I believe it is helpful to use a wide definition of regulation, derived from the late Ronald Coase, as the establishment and maintenance of a legal framework within which legitimate economic activity may be carried out", 42 and to adopt Coase's corollary recognition that "The term 'regulation' … is often confined to the work of the [executive], but regulation is also the result of legislative and judicial actions, and it seems ill-advised not to take these into consideration". On this definition of regulation, intervention may itself be defined as a specific form of regulation which, unlike the general regulation which makes choice in a market possible, attempts to alter market outcomes. On these definitions, Smith The first and chief design of every system of government is to maintain justice; to prevent the members of a society from encroaching on one another's property, or seizing what is not their own. The design here is to give each one the secure and peaceable possession of his own property … we may call [this end] internal peace.
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Having established private property in goods by regulation, we must now turn to the establishment and promotion of exchange of those goods. It is not going too far to claim that, obviously initially most surprisingly, Smith says almost nothing about this. The concept by which he addresses the issues is that of "police". Having secured ownership: the government will next be desirous of promoting the opulence of the state. This produces what we will call police. Whatever regulations are made with respect to the trade, commerce, agriculture, manufactures of the country are considered as belonging to the police.
could Smith's concept of the tolerable administration of justice, which he was apt to describe as the sovereign's duty "of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it", 45 and which he believed inevitably would require an expansion of laws in proportion to the improvement of a society. 46 But, though it is right to say that The Wealth of Nations was pre-eminently concerned with the promotion of the opulence of commercial society, 47 and though this meant increasing the volume of exchange, 48 Smith certainly did not view police in this expansive manner. Insisting in his conception of general jurisprudence upon a strict separation of justice and police, 49 he saw the latter as a "mean" or "trifling" subject embracing the "inferior parts of government", one which, police being a strange term to the contemporary reader, would perhaps now be better rendered as "(public) management". Being based on the shifting grounds of "expediency" rather than stable principles of "justice", 50 police did not really have to be considered in light of the great principles of government as did the maintenance of external and internal peace. 51 In this concept of police, to speak of regulation was to speak of, as it were, ad hoc sets of rules for particular activities intended to promote the growth of opulence, but which are incidental to the core of economic action, which is exchange.
In sum, whilst Smith acknowledges the necessity of regulation to establish private property, he does not similarly recognise the necessity of regulation to establish exchange. entitlement. 52 Of course, this avoidance might be said to follow inevitably from Smith's intention to establish the general case for laissez faire. The regulations of police and the provision of public works had their place, but the most important thing was to keep government out of the basic economic process of exchange, for there self-interest, the propensity to exchange and the invisible hand would produce the best results, but they could do so only if left alone by government.
I have argued in much previous work that this "deregulatory" view is misleading. The particular error that it has led to in the interpretation of Smith that is of interest here is about the nature of self-interest when pursued through exchange. We will see that Smith's concept of self-interested exchange is an intimately moral, other-regarding one which calls for, but does not adequately receive from Smith himself, consideration of the necessary and necessarily extensive channelling of self-interest into the form of exchange by regulation in the sense I have given the term, albeit that that regulation principally takes the private form of the law of contract. Paradoxically, to grasp this requires us to turn to one who, whilst his profound admiration for Smith was based on very considerable Smith scholarship, put forward what was intended to be the most radical criticism of him: Karl Marx.
C. SMITH ON SELF-INTEREST AND EXCHANGE
Though they may be deficient in the way I claim, Smith's various comments on exchange yield one of the most important answers yet given to the question why the pursuit of selfinterest through exchange is generally beneficent. I have noted that self-interest as mere appropriation is untrammelled, but perhaps the better way to put it is that it is solipsistic.
"Exchanges" that are made because one actor has, say, violently exercised duress over 52 R Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) at 150-151.
another show so complete a focus on the actor's own interest as to completely disregard the other's interest.
If language of this grandiloquence may be excused, it has been a matter of economic theory of significance for the entire history of the modern world that the only account of the social process of exchange that fundamentally adds to Smith is, paradoxically, that of the social theorist whose case for the complete abolition of the market economy has most merited serious consideration. In Capital volume 1, Marx described the process of exchange as follows. The owners of goods:
must behave in such a way that each does not appropriate the [goods] of the other, and part with his own, except by means of an act done by mutual consent. They must, therefore, mutually recognise in each other the rights of private proprietors. This juridical relation, which thus expresses itself in a contract … is a relation between two wills and is but the reflex of the real economic relation of the two. It is this economic relation that determines the subject matter comprised in each such juridical act.
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Three vital features of exchange emerge from this description of it, two of which Smith clearly embraced, but the third of which, though it is integral to Smith's thinking, Smith himself did not adequately articulate, and Marx's description of exchange is essential to grasping this third feature.
The first feature Marx describes (the second as he presents them) is that economic actors must recognise "the rights of private proprietors". The second feature (the first as he presents them) is that the transfer of goods must be "by means of an act done by mutual consent". We have seen that Smith was fully aware of the necessity of regulating to establish The significance of the now included and emphasised clauses is that it shows the economic actor indeed entering into an exchange to pursue his own self-interest -"give me that which I want" -but he can pursue his own self-interest only by obtaining the consent of the other actor to transfer that which is wanted by giving the other actor what he wants -"you shall have this which you want". The first actor must secure the other actor's consent to exchange by, as Smith put it in the Lectures on Jurisprudence, "setting before him a sufficient temptation" to transfer the goods wanted. 57 To adopt the term used in the Lectures on Jurisprudence, exchange is based on persuasion:
If we should enquire into the principle in the human mind on which the [propensity to exchange] is founded, it is clearly the natural inclination everyone has to persuade. The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and simple a meaning, is in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so as it is for his interest.
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In its ideal typical form, exchange is not altruistic. 59 Neither actor directly wishes to promote the well-being of the other but only to pursue his own self-interest. But, as with the initial recognition of private property, the process of transfer is not based on solipsistic selfinterest. It is analytically based on a recognition of the self-interest of the other, and the economic actor accepts, not merely that pursuit of his own self-interest must allow the other actor to pursue his own self-interest, but that the first actor can pursue his own self-interest only by being the means by which the other pursues his. Self-interest in exchange is, Marx tells us when identifying the third vital feature of exchange, a form of "mutual recognition".
Though there is no direct textual warrant for this, Marx undoubtedly derived his description of exchange from GWF Hegel's various comments on contract, which make the necessity of consensual exchange, 60 and mutual recognition as the means of obtaining consent, 61 essential features of contract. The concept of mutual recognition is at the heart of Hegel's entire contribution to moral and political philosophy, 62 and has most important dimensions which cannot be considered here. It is necessary only to emphasise that exchange is based on selfinterest, and shares this with mere appropriation, but that, whereas mere appropriation is a solipsistic exercise of self-interest, 63 this is the last thing that can be said of exchange, which has the moral, other-regarding component of mutual recognition as its analytically essential feature, ie the feature that distinguishes exchange from solipsistic forms of the pursuit of self- "narrowness" becomes associated with passivity and minimalism. This cannot be right. The narrowest optimal limits are set at the points where regulation intended to promote private opulence through exchange actually ceases to promote it; which, to put the point the other way around, means that regulation more minimal than this is not optimally sufficient. and scope. Any proposed regulation would, however, have to be defended on its merits after it has been acknowledged, in no small part due to Smith, that regulation which, even if not intended to do so, hinders rather than facilitates exchange, runs counter to the public interest in the operation of the market as the best conceivable form of general economy.
D. SMITH ON SELF-INTEREST AND THE LAW OF CONTRACT
Smith's failure to appreciate the extent of regulation which his own argument shows to be optimal is even more clear in regard of the law of contract than it is with regard to government action. This was inevitable as the wide concept of regulation I am using in one sense simply overrides the strong distinction between government (ie executive and legislature) and the courts, and the confidence that the courts were strictly confined to adjudication, 75 which were central to Smith's views on the constitutional law and politics of liberty. 76 Smith could not be expected to systematically bring private law under his concept of police. I believe I am justified in doing just this because it is essential to include the private law in any comprehensive account of the regulation of economic action, and because it is possible to do so without reducing the private law to merely a means of implementing government intervention. Though Smith's account of the law of contract is brief and in fact somewhat derivative, it makes, as one of course expects, points of value, and in particular contains a reliance theory of liability that has continuing interest. But Smith had no great familiarity with the law, and there is little or nothing of value in his work explicitly on the law of contract about how economic exchanges are actually made. But once one appreciates the active aspect of regulation for facilitation of the market economy, then the extremely important implication for the law of contract of understanding that exchange is based on mutual recognition may be made clear.
There is a striking footnote provided by a In all voluntary contracts, both parties gain. For a long time, however, people were possessed of the idea that one man's gain is another man's loss. Unfortunately, legislation proceeded on this fallacy, and consequently busied itself with restrictions, prohibitions, compensation and the like. believe, undeniable if unclear. We have seen that when Smith discusses the process of exchange in itself rather than the urge to betterment which begins the process, the essential feature of that process is shown to be, not the solipsistic pursuit of self-interest, but persuasion. These passages are brief or very brief. But they should be read in the context of Smith's much more sustained examination of the bounds of the legitimate exercise of selfinterest generally, ie in economic and other contexts, the principal theme of which is that the untrammelled exercise of self-interest is immoral, and will be felt to be so by the human being of good will:
There is no commonly honest man … who does not inwardly feel the truth of the great Stoical maxim that for one man to deprive another unjustly of anything, or unjustly to promote his advantage by the loss of another, is more contrary to nature than death, than poverty, than pain, than all the misfortunes which can affect him either in his body or in his external circumstances.
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This sets rules, to put it this way, for the legitimate pursuit of self-interest, rules that may allow the acquisition of goods from another, but not their unjust deprivation; and may allow the promotion of individual advantage, but not by unjustly causing another loss. Such rules certainly cover the initial ownership of goods, but they would be pointless unless they included rules about the process of transfer, for, of course, the value of initial ownership will be reduced or nullified by defects in that process. Smith accordingly tells us that "In the race for wealth and honours and preferments", one who is legitimately self-interested must:
humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to something which other men can go along with. They will indulge it so far as to allow him to be more anxious about, and to pursue with more earnest assiduity, his own happiness rather than that of any other person … In the race for wealth and honours and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of … they do not enter into that self-love by which he prefers himself so much to this other. offer. The claimants regarded this as a breach of contract. 82 The claimants did not dispute that the conveyance itself was subject to contract, and the breach they alleged was not of this agreement but of a collateral contract which stipulated certain conditions under which negotiation of the main contract was to have been conducted.
It was clear at the outset that these negotiations would take some time, not least because the defendants sought an assurance of the claimants' ability to pay the price offered, and a comfort letter was obtained from the claimants' bankers. But, aware of the defendants' relationship with their accountants, the claimants were extremely insistent that they would provide this letter, and otherwise commit themselves to the negotiations, only if the defendants agreed to negotiate with them exclusively. 83 It was not disputed that the relevant terms under which the comfort letter was provided were set out in a letter from the claimants to the defendants' solicitor:
[ The alleged breach was of this contract which purported to "lock out" other potential buyers of PNM, including, of course, the accountants who did eventually buy it.
Without fully going into the commercial background which certainly can justify the use of a lock-out agreement in appropriate circumstances, it is necessary here only to say that it was not really argued that a potential offeror cannot in principle protect the expenditure it must make in drawing up its offer by seeking a period of exclusivity in negotiations, and this 82 For reasons of space, a claim for misrepresentation, though of significance, will not be discussed. This claim was not the occasion of the reference to misrepresentation in Lord Ackner's famous dictum. 83 Walford v Miles [1990] 1 EGLR 212 at 214D-E (QB). 84 Walford v Miles (HL) (n 9) 133E. was allowed by Lord Ackner. 85 If the law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract (when there is a fundamental term yet to be agreed) it seems to me it cannot recognise a contract to negotiate. The reason is because it is too uncertain to have any binding force … It seems to me that a contract to negotiate, like a contract to enter into a contract, is not a contract known to the law … I think we must apply the general principle that where there is a fundamental matter left undecided and to be the subject of negotiation, there is no contract.
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In Courtney and Fairbairn v Tolaini, negotiations had been started about the development of a building site, but the term which remained to be agreed, about which it was argued there was an agreement to agree, was in essence the price of extensive works to be undertaken. Though the case does, in fact, give rise to some concern, 87 it is submitted that it is correct to refuse to enforce an agreement of this nature in circumstances akin to those of 87 The decision in the case allowed the defendant to benefit from work the claimant did in arranging finance for the works without the claimant deriving any of the benefit of the consideration of carrying out the works itself. 88 As we shall see, the nature of the main contract is crucial context for deciding upon the enforceability of the collateral contract, and in particular the pricing of complex works, conveyances and the like must be distinguished from the pricing of standard goods or goods about which a price can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry, which, of course, are dealt with under The Sales of Goods Act 1979 s 8(2). Even more significant is the distinction between possible gap-filling in agreements and gap-filling in performance after, ex hypothesi, agreement has been reached. Lord Ackner was anxious to draw this distinction when commenting on the idea of "best endeavours" (Walford v Miles (HL) (n 9) 138B-C) and from, as it were, the opposite perspective, so was Leggatt J in Yam Seng (n 1) [122] , Yam Seng being akin to a best endeavours case. For reasons of space, I shall not pursue this issue.
Walford v Miles) would certainly be undermined were the collateral contract enforceable.
Discussion of the agreement to agree is in general undermined by confusion over the concept of the want of certainty. It is not that performance of the principal obligations under any main contract would need an undesirable or indeed impossible level of court supervision in order to be performed. 89 It is that, were an agreement to agree enforced then, fearing a substantial damages award reflecting lost expectation on the main contract, 90 the defendant would be effectively obliged to reach an agreement (or pay for release), and such constraints obliging the defendant to agree would unacceptably undermine the persuasive, voluntary nature of that agreement. I repeat that, whilst it is entirely conceivable that a party would agree to conduct its negotiations under certain restrictions of its freedom to contract (such as an exclusivity agreement), it is not reasonably conceivable that a party would objectively intend to curtail its capacity to choose in this drastic way.
As much commentary has indicated, Walford v Miles can readily be distinguished from
Courtney and Fairbairn v Tolaini. A lock-out agreement qua lock-out agreement is not an agreement to agree. It rather obliges the defendant to negotiate exclusively with the claimant for the agreement's duration. As we have seen, Lord Ackner himself allowed such agreements in principle. The issue is why the lock-out agreement in Walford v Miles was viewed differently.
Lord Ackner regarded it as very important that this particular lock-out agreement did not specify its duration. 91 It may have been wiser for the claimants to have specified a date by 89 There could be no question of specific performance and I am unaware of any authority in relevant circumstances leading to, as it were, indirect specific performance by means of prohibitory injunction. 90 The judgment at first instance in Walford v Miles (QB) (n 83) 214E-F would lead one to think such an award would have been made but the parties had agreed that quantum would be determined by a higher court. The matter was discussed by Bingham LJ in Walford v Miles [1991] 2 EGLR 185 at 188G, 189G-J (CA) and en passant in Walford v Miles (HL) (n 9) 137B-C, but, of course, these discussions were obiter. For reasons of space I will not examine this difficult question as it arose in the law applicable to Walford v Miles but, in principle, I believe that expectation loss on the main contract is clearly proximate and should be recoverable for breach of the collateral contract. Limitations on any award of expectation damages might arise from reasons of want of certainty which are not specific to an exclusivity agreement. 91 Walford v Miles (HL) (n 9) 136D-E. which agreement should have been reached, and after Walford v Miles one would be inclined to take this into account when giving advice.
92 But in the case itself it is hard to maintain this position for one can readily see why the parties instead saw the matter as one of the agreement lasting for a "reasonable time", 93 which, by avoiding a specific date, or by being usefully relaxed about any such date, 94 would itself have minimised one source of pressure to agree. In the Court of Appeal, Bingham LJ, dissenting, had little problem implying the necessary term, 95 and it is not necessary to go into the considerable authority which may be marshalled in justification of his doing so because it is, I believe, generally agreed that, had the lock-out agreement been seen only as a negative exclusivity agreement rather than a positive agreement to agree, it would have been enforceable, and the defendants' breach of it, though it was the principal issue of fact to be decided at first instance, 96 should then have been unarguable.
It was very largely some unwisely over-ambitious pleading by the claimants in response to the perceived difficulty of the agreement's having no specific duration that led Lord Ackner to formulate the dictum which has led to Walford v Miles becoming so influential. 97 The lock-out agreement detailed in the claimants' letter quoted above 98 was made the basis of the statement of claim, but that statement was amended so that the following was added:
It was a term of the [lock-out] agreement necessarily to be implied to give business efficacy thereto that, so long as they continued to desire to sell the said 92 Pitt v PHH Asset Management Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 327 at 332-333. 93 Walford v Miles (HL) (n 9) 136D. 94 I am at a loss to explain why the trial judge's finding that the claimants specified that the exclusivity agreement was agreed "with a view to concluding the deal as soon as possible after April 6" did not play a larger part in the appeals: Walford v Miles (QB) (n 83) 214E. 95 Walford v Miles (CA) (n 90) 188F-G. 96 Evidence that the defendants and the eventual buyers of PNM did not in fact continue to negotiate was not believed by the trial judge: Walford v Miles (QB) (n 83) 214F-215B. 97 Walford v Miles (HL) (n 9) 140D. 98 See text accompanying n 84.
property and shares, the [defendants] would continue to negotiate in good faith with the plaintiff. 99 The purpose of this was to show that the negotiations could not, in the absence of a date for their conclusion, go on forever, but this particular way of doing this purports to transform the negative agreement not to negotiate with others into a positive agreement to agree with the claimant if PNM was to be sold at all, and as such it was rightly rejected by Lord Ackner. 100 Lord Ackner claimed that there was a want of certainty because the main contract was still subject to contract and so literally had not been agreed, 101 but an air of casuistry about this arises from its being an indirect way of referring to the real mischief, which is that enforcing this specific collateral contract as it emerged from the claimants' pleadings would tend to push the defendants into the main agreement in an unacceptable way. The vital clause was not "negotiate in good faith" but "so long as they continued to desire to sell".
If this was not enough, when further pressed on the, as it were, variant point of how the defendants were to end the negotiations if an agreement to sell was not concluded, the defendant suggested that "a term was to be implied giving the [defendants] a right to determine the negotiations, but only if they had 'a proper reason'". 102 Lord Ackner was unprepared to countenance the burden he saw this imposing on the courts of deciding whether or not any reason given was proper, 103 and this was the precise occasion for his famous comments on good faith:
uncertainty is demonstrated in the instant case by the provision which it is said has to be implied in the agreement for the determination of the negotiations. How can a court be expected to decide whether … a proper reason existed for the termination of negotiations? The answer suggested depends upon whether the negotiations have been determined "in good faith". However the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids Lord Ackner himself allowed, some agreements which impose bargaining restrictions serve a valuable commercial purpose and it is regrettable that the way he phrased his argument would seem to have led to his judgment obstructing the development of the law of such agreements.
But this is not at all the point I am trying to make. The crucial point here is that, far from legitimating the exercise of solipsistic self-interest, Lord Ackner was seeking, in the circumstances of Walford v Miles, to preserve the persuasive, voluntary nature of any possible agreement between the parties for the sale of PNM. He may to some extent have been wrong in the way he went about this, but, however this is, his motivation in reaching his conclusion is the opposite of what it is generally taken to be.
One intent on underwriting solipsistic self-interest could hardly have found the claimants' position in Walford v Miles unattractive, for their self-interest is a prominent feature of the case. We do not know how the claimants learned of PNM's being put up for sale, but we do know that they themselves had no knowledge of photographic processing, 111 and one imagines they would quickly have sold on the business. They believed that the offer price "dramatically undervalued" PNM, 112 and indeed their contract claim was based on the difference between their £2 million offer and the £3 million which they believed was the market value of the company. 113 In addition to the favourable price, in the negotiations the claimants secured, not only the purported lock-out agreement, but a guarantee of PNM's profitability which it was very unwise of the defendants to agree but which nevertheless should itself have been enforceable. 114 The claimants evidently entered into these negotiations in the correct belief that the default rules of contractual negotiation impose no In Yam Seng, Leggatt J identifies all sorts of specific duties which regulate agreement, and even his pathbreaking judgment does not cover all the ground. Those who simply do not agree that these duties regulating agreement are to be found in the English law and I must part company. As it happens, I would not wish to argue that these are the correct duties or that they should be amalgamated into a general doctrine of good faith. 115 I do, however, wish to argue that the law of contract contains an extensive set of other-regarding duties constituting a framework for facilitating agreement, and I am of the opinion that a clear 115 Campbell (n 11) and Campbell (n 3).
understanding about this may best be reached through a concept (not a general doctrine) of good faith. Even if this is so, it can be only because contractual agreement is not based on solipsistic self-interest but on self-interest which recognises other-regarding duties.
F. WALFORD v MILES AS A RELATIONAL CONTRACT
It remains the case that the relational theory of contract which the late Ian Macneil did most to put on a theoretically sound foundation is generally understood as an attempt to distinguish a class of "relational", or "cooperative", contracts from "discrete", or "competitive" On this basis, Macneil was able coherently to explain why the law of contract is constituted of doctrines which are "plainly restrictions on freedom of contract", 116 a puzzlingly state of affairs if that freedom is looked upon as a matter of solipsistic selfinterest. These doctrines, such as those that Lord Ackner's famous dictum omits but on which Leggatt J focuses:
appear as exceptions to some general rule permitting the parties fully to define their legal status [but] if the role of the law in creating contracts were more completely presented this distortion would not occur, and these matters would be seen not as exceptions to freedom of contract but as simply part of the law's definition of contract.
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It is a sign of our current confusion that Lord Ackner's attempt to preserve the persuasive, voluntary nature of agreement has been interpreted as a defence of the solipsistic self-interest which he himself in fact rejects, and that he no doubt understood the issue in this mistaken way himself. Whilst Lord Ackner was in a most important sense right to describe negotiations as "adversarial", and one can admire the air of certainty he therefore gave to his statement of the point he was trying to make, he omitted the essential features of what he was trying to describe. It is, of course, pure speculation, but nevertheless reflection on the extremely elaborate system of rules and courtesy that govern, and so make possible, the legal proceedings that Lord Ackner, formerly a very distinguished advocate, may have had in mind when choosing the word "adversarial" perhaps makes his real meaning clear. We must come to terms with the fact that Walford v Miles, like all contracts, is a relational contract.
G. CONCLUSION
The disappointing reception of Leggatt J's recognition of the existence of duties connected to good faith in Yam Seng is, in the end, traceable, not to explicit legal doctrine, but to the attitude taken by parties making a contractual agreement which is implied by those who deny they are implying any such attitude when interpreting such an agreement. Solipsistic selfinterest is so much regarded as legitimate or even natural that it disappears from conscious understanding. Such a way of understanding freedom of contract constitutes a literal acceptance of laissez faire which is simply unsupportable (and so is overwhelmingly hedged about with incoherent exceptions when actually put into effect in legislation and adjudication). 
